By K Raveendran
All theories of probabilities, intuition and a cursory glance at the balance sheets of past trade negotiations point in one direction: any trade deal between the United States and India under the Trump presidency is far more likely to tilt in favour of the US. This assertion is not rooted in cynicism but in a long trail of evidence and patterns seen over the years.
Donald Trump, who views trade deals as opportunities to wrest economic advantage with a show of force, has made it clear that his metrics for a ‘successful’ deal revolve around what he can sell back to his voters. And more often than not, this comes at the cost of his trade partners—especially those who, like India, may be less inclined or politically unable to push back with the same aggression.
India, for its part, has maintained a conspicuous silence. The government has not clarified its position on the ongoing trade discussions, allowing speculation and anxiety to fill the vacuum. This silence can be interpreted in two ways: either the government is holding its cards close to its chest in anticipation of a complex negotiation, or it is unwilling—or unable—to publicly contest the narrative being set in Washington. In either case, the lack of transparency from New Delhi does not inspire confidence that India is entering the deal as an equal partner.
Trump, with his characteristic flamboyance, has already been touting the impending deal as a personal victory. He has built it up in his speeches, weaving it into his larger narrative of “America First” and presenting it as yet another example of how he is bringing foreign nations to heel. In Trump’s transactional worldview, deals are about domination, not diplomacy. It’s less about partnership and more about profit—and it is that very mindset that casts a long shadow over the expected trade agreement with India.
The Modi-Trump dynamic only deepens the imbalance. Much has been made of the so-called “bromance” between the two leaders. But personal rapport, while useful for photo ops and tweetable quotes, rarely shields countries from the hard arithmetic of trade. In fact, the more public the friendship, the greater the vulnerability—because Trump, unlike traditional diplomats, tends to exploit personal relationships for strategic leverage. In this case, Modi’s visible camaraderie might be used to press India into concessions under the guise of goodwill.
There’s also the structural imbalance in bargaining power. The US, under Trump, has used its position as the world’s largest consumer market as a blunt instrument. It has unilaterally imposed tariffs, withdrawn trade preferences, and even threatened sanctions to compel trade partners into renegotiations. India has experienced some of this already. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which gave Indian exporters tariff-free access to the US market, was unilaterally revoked by the Trump administration. That was not just a punitive move; it was a signal that the US would not hesitate to weaponize trade instruments to push its agenda.
That warning has been reinforced by Trump’s latest announcement—imposing a 10 percent additional tariff on all BRICS nations, India included. It is not a coincidence. Trump is looking to extract every ounce of political capital from his trade policy. Targeting BRICS, an alliance often seen as a counterweight to Western dominance, allows Trump to signal strength at home while applying pressure abroad. For India, this tariff escalation effectively shrinks the negotiating space even further. It is now expected to enter a trade deal while already under economic duress.
The timeline of the deal’s announcement has also taken on the contours of a power play. Originally expected by July 9, the deadline has now been moved—unilaterally—by Trump to August 1. This shift, devoid of any diplomatic explanation or joint communique, reinforces the perception that the US is setting the pace, tone, and terms of engagement. India is, at best, reacting. At worst, it is conceding. This kind of timeline manipulation not only disrespects the principle of equal sovereignty but also underscores how Trump intends to keep India dangling—just enough to create anticipation, but never enough to regain control over the narrative.
Under such circumstances, the content of the trade deal becomes almost secondary. What matters more is the message: that the US can continue to impose its will unilaterally, that India will not push back publicly, and that any opposition to Trump’s terms will be muted or buried under the rhetoric of “strategic partnership.” Whatever is eventually signed—and there will likely be something, if only for the political optics—may be celebrated in Washington as a triumph of Trump’s tactics and in New Delhi as an example of diplomatic pragmatism. But the reality will be more sobering.
India’s trade deficit with the US, already a point of contention, could be used as a justification for further concessions. The US wants greater market access for its agricultural goods, dairy products, and medical devices—sectors in which India has traditionally maintained protective barriers. Any significant relaxation in these sectors will not only affect Indian producers but also trigger domestic political backlash. On the other side, India’s demands for easier access for its information technology professionals and greater freedom in service sectors have long met with resistance in Washington. If past experience is any guide, the US will extract more than it gives—unless India is prepared to stand its ground, which seems increasingly unlikely.
The stakes for India go beyond economics. There’s a strategic dimension to all of this. India is positioning itself as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific region, and the US has been eager to cultivate India as a regional ally. But alignment in geopolitics does not guarantee generosity in trade. Trump has consistently demonstrated that even allies must pay their dues—often literally. If India thought that strategic convergence with the US would translate into better trade terms, that illusion is now being tested.
Moreover, India’s own domestic economic challenges—slowing growth, rising unemployment, and a struggling manufacturing sector—make it particularly vulnerable to lopsided trade deals. The government may calculate that conceding ground to the US could bring short-term stability or investor confidence, but such concessions come at a long-term cost. Structural dependence on a trading partner that operates on a transactional basis only deepens economic fragility. (IPA Service)
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